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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Can't stand the rain? 
President Yel'tsin's vacations are infamous. In the early years of his presidency, 
we wondered at the timing of his retreats, as in September 1991 when he 
squandered the momentum of his post-coup popularity with an extended respite 
from political engagement. In the later years of his first term and certainly the 
beginning of his second, the state of the president's mental and physical health 
dominated analyses of his vacations. The Kremlin staff frequently contributed to 
speculation through their own reticence and obfuscation. Certainly we recall the 
publication of a months-old photograph meant to portray the president's fitness 
during one "disappearance," or the remarkable transformation of a sore throat 
into "colossal fatigue," which finally developed into coronary disease requiring 
bypass surgery. 
 
Nonetheless, the president and his staff may have outdone themselves this time. 
With rumors of an impending coup suffusing the political atmosphere, 
encouraged by Yel'tsin's own comments on the possibility, the president 
departed Moscow for Karelia (via St. Petersburg for an appearance at Tsar 
Nicholas' funeral service). Accompanying the president on this vacation were an 
unusual number of medical personnel and an "unprecedented" security detail. 
(Komsomol'skaya pravda, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
Initially, this retreat followed previous patterns, with the president neither 
addressing reporters, nor venturing out for photo ops. The arrival of Prime 
Minister Sergei Kirienko certainly disrupted the tranquility however, as the 
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president appeared with Kirienko before the media to announce the signature of 
a number of decrees regarding personnel issues. Yel'tsin did not immediately 
make public the specifics of the decrees, preferring to leave the release of such 
information to his press service, but he did contribute the following comments on 
personnel policy: 
 
"Sometimes, someone's dismissal is not easily understood by the press. (...) 
However, I am much more informed than you are, and I know who and how has 
been working [sic] day by day on each case, on any crime either solved or not, 
and believe me, I feel quite out of sorts knowing what I do." (ITAR-TASS, 25 Jul 
98; NEXIS) 
 
The press service later announced the dismissal of FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev 
(more under "FSB" heading). Yel'tsin's dismissal of the head of the Security 
Services was already stoking the flames of coup-mongering when Yel'tsin 
abruptly ended his Karelian vacation and returned to the capital. While 
presidential aides insisted that rainy weather had prompted the premature exit 
from Karelia, President Yel'tsin claimed that "urgent matters" involving the 
"complicated political and economic situation in the country" required his 
presence in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS, 0815 GMT, 29 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-210) 
 
Despite reports that the President would continue his vacation elsewhere, Yel'tsin 
is currently at Gorki-9, where he has held meetings with the Prime Minister, 
foreign loan negotiator Anatoli Chubais, and the new FSB Director Vladimir Putin.  
 
GOVERNMENT 
IMF slaps Russia's wrist 
In what appeared to be a mild criticism of Russian efforts to begin 
implementation of negotiated reforms, the International Monetary Fund reduced 
the amount of the first installment of Russian bailout monies from $5.6 billion to 
$4.8 billion. Anatoli Chubais, who represented Russia in the IMF negotiations, 
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claimed that the temporary $800 million shortfall would not have a serious 
impact. (ITAR-TASS, 0038 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
Communist deputy joins cabinet 
Yuri Maslyukov, former chair of the Duma Economics Policies Committee, has 
been appointed Minister for Trade and Industry by presidential decree. (ITAR-
TASS, 1305 GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) Maslyukov has requested that 
the prime minister expand the responsibilities of the ministry to include oversight 
of the military-industrial sector and foreign economic relations. (Ekho Moskvy, 
1800 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209) 
 
Chernomyrdin on call 
A 14 July meeting between President Yel'tsin and former Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin prompted speculation that Chernomyrdin may soon return to the 
government, perhaps as a liaison between tax collectors and the energy industry 
directors, with whom he has long had close ties. While there has been no word 
on an official role for Chernomyrdin, he did make an appearance at the first 
Gore-Kirienko Commission meeting. According to ITAR-TASS (1645 GMT, 24 Jul 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-205), American VP Gore sought a private meeting with 
Chernomyrdin at the US embassy, but Kirienko suggested they include his 
predecessor at the commission's meeting in the Government House. 
 
Kirienko threatens miners 
Striking miners blocking the Trans-Siberian Railroad are clearly the subject of 
great concern within the Russian government. Sergei Kirienko has responded to 
the strikes by reminding the miners that the Security Council decided in May that 
blocking the railways is a punishable criminal offense. Claiming that the 
government was fulfilling its obligations to the miners according to the 
agreements negotiated in May, Kirienko suggested that the coal miners should 
not expect all their problems to be solved at once. (Interfax, 1404 GMT, 18 Jul 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-199) 
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The workers' protests are also the focus of a significant portion of the coup 
scenario analyses. There is, however, little agreement as to who or what group 
may be inciting the strikers' demonstrations. Two recent articles from the Russian 
press suggest the diversity of opinion on the cause of the strikes: 
 
From Moskovskiy komsomolets (16 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209): "The president's 
staff is now almost 100 percent certain that the miners' weeks-long picketing of 
the House of Government was financed with Berezovsky's money." 
 
Literaturnaya gazeta (15 Jul 98, pp. 1-2; FBIS-SOV-98-209) has a radically 
different take: "Today, [Communist Deputy Viktor] Ilyukhin represents a link 
uniting the "people's" rebels with potential putschists from among the special 
services personnel." 
 
The current pressing concern is less a matter of which flank may launch an 
attack, but rather that the political and economic climate is in enough turmoil to 
make an attack seem likely. 
 
FSB 
Kovalev replaced with Putin 
President Yel'tsin's above-referenced remarks notwithstanding, the dismissal of 
Kovalev, and perhaps more importantly his replacement by Vladimir Putin, may 
have long been in the works. Kovalev, often associated with "Chernomyrdin's 
team," was first threatened with dismissal during the May 1997 reorganization of 
the Security Services and Putin was believed the likely successor then. 
 
Putin, who was recently appointed to head up the president's Main Control 
Department and has close contacts within the president's staff, is also part of the 
St. Petersburg "clan" that followed Anatoli Chubais into Moscow federal 
government service. Putin's qualifications are more than political however, as he 
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has many years of KGB service (first directorate -- intelligence) on his resume as 
well. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 26 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-207) 
 
Kovalev's dismissal decree noted his transfer to other work, and Prime Minister 
Kirienko made an effort to dampen speculation that Kovalev's performance had 
incited the firing by adding his assurance that Kovalev "will continue to be used to 
the Motherland's benefit." (ITAR-TASS, 0816 GMT, 27 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
208) 
 
Despite the calming remarks, it still seems an odd presidential vacation that 
requires interruption for the sacking of the head of the Security Services and an 
unplanned and hurried return to the capital. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Ray Gaul 
 
Russia denies supplying weapons to Afghan fighters... 
The Russian foreign ministry on 28 July denied that Russia is supporting one of 
Afghanistan's warring parties. 
 
The ministry's Information and Press Department stated that, "Russia strictly 
adheres to its position of noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs," in 
response to a New York Times article published the previous day. The New York 
Times asserted that Russia was supplying weapons, training and logistical 
support to the northern alliance group that is fighting against the Taliban for 
control of northern Afghanistan. The article claimed that Russia was assisting the 
rebel group led by Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, as well as Russian and Uzbeki 
assistance to the rebel group led by 'Abdol Rashid Dostum (both forces side with 
the northern alliance). 
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Although a high-ranking source in Moscow admitted that the anti-Taliban forces 
in northern Afghanistan are viewed sympathetically in Moscow, the Russian 
government claims non-intervention, on the premise that more weapons 
ultimately lead to more fighting which is strongly against Russian interests. 
(Interfax, 1113 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209) 
 
...But opposes Afghan arms embargo 
The Russian government opposes any arms embargo on Afghanistan, and has 
stated that any embargo would only be beneficial for one of the conflicting sides. 
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release on 28 July, the same day Russian 
denials of arms deliveries to the northern alliance were issued, stated that, 
"despite the attractiveness of the idea of an international embargo on such 
supplies proposed by a number of countries, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
believes that it could hardly be implemented given that efficient control over the 
Afghan- Pakistani border is impossible."  
 
While reasserting Russia's "non-intervention" position in the war, the foreign 
ministry statement simultaneously implied that Afghanistan's neighboring 
countries are supplying arms to the warring factions in Afghanistan. The 
statement did not directly accuse any neighboring country of supplying weapons 
but stated that peace can only be achieved in Afghanistan when " the country's 
neighbors and countries interested in peace in Afghanistan prevent their territory 
from being used for arms supply." (Interfax, 1113 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
209) 
 
Although Russia repeatedly asserts that peace in Afghanistan is in the best 
interest of Russia as well as all the states of the CIS, full Taliban control of the 
country could serve to destabilize further the situation in Tajikistan. Additionally, 
Taliban control of Afghanistan could ultimately result in a Turkmen-sponsored 
pipeline through Afghanistan that would avoid the Russian pipeline network. 
 
 7 
Primakov identifies source of extremism in Kosovo 
Using a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a 
forum to discuss the Kosovo conflict, Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov 
reiterated his "three nos" as Russia's official policy in the troubled Serbian 
province. First, Russia opposes the status quo whereby Kosovo does not have 
considerable autonomy rights. Second, Russia is saying no to separatism. Third, 
Russia objects to the possible use of outside force on Yugoslav territory. 
Reinforcing his third no, Primakov was quoted as saying "such actions without a 
corresponding request from Yugoslavia would be unjustified and would create a 
serious precedent." He also stated that the threat of intervention has resulted in 
"extremism from the side of Kosovo Albanians," and places the main 
responsibility for peaceful negotiations to determine the fate of the Serbian 
province on the Kosovo Albanians. (Interfax, 1735 GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-209, and Interfax, 0951 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-205) 
 
Primakov's position is that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is keeping his 
promise to start talks with the Kosovo Albanians and that it is the ethnic 
Albanians who are preventing the talks from starting. With the recent advances of 
the Serbian forces against Albanian separatists in Kosovo, Milosevic does not 
appear ready to announce any cease-fire that might translate to the start of 
negotiations on the future of Kosovo. 
 
A week earlier in Moscow, a foreign ministry spokesman stressed many of these 
same points as he announced that Moscow is not against political representation 
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in any talks that may be held. Although this 
statement appeared to represent an easing of Russia's position concerning the 
status of the KLA, the Russian foreign ministry reiterated Moscow's opposition to 
any direct representation of the KLA, stressing that it must be a political party that 
represents the KLA interests. (Interfax, 1622 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
Russia: SFOR detentions beyond mandate 
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Citing the recent mistaken detention of two Bosnian Serbs, Moscow denounced 
the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) policy of detaining and extraditing suspected war 
criminals. A Russian foreign ministry statement on 28 July reinforced Moscow's 
position that detention and extradition of suspected war criminals is "the 
exclusive prerogative of the Serb Republic, and Bosnia and Herzegovina." The 
spokesmen referred to the SFOR incident as a demonstration of the dangers 
associated with putting SFOR forces "in a dubious position," stressing that such 
operations are not implied in the SFOR mandate. The Russian contingent of 
SFOR does not engage in the detention of suspected war criminals to be 
extradited to the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. (Interfax, 1648 
GMT, 28 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-209) 
 
Russia welcomes Iran's adherence to non-proliferation regime... 
Russia and Iran confirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and 
disarmament and supported the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the 
Middle East, a Russian press release stated on 18 July. Russia and Iran urged 
all concerned countries to consider practical measures aimed at realizing the 
idea of a nuclear-free zone and called for a speedy accession to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of all countries which have not joined it yet. As a 
warning to any attempt to interfere by force in the ongoing nuclear projects in 
Iran, both sides stressed that an attack or a threat of attack on "peaceful nuclear 
facilities" would pose a threat to nuclear security and could trigger a 
corresponding international response as provided for in the UN Charter. The 
official Russian press release following the high-level meetings on 15 and 16 July 
stated that Russia welcomed Iran's adherence to the non-proliferation regime 
and its lack of intention to get access to nuclear weapons. (ITAR-TASS, 1409 
GMT, 18 Jul 98; FBIS-TAC-98-199) 
 
...While Russia acknowledges Iran's attempts to acquire technologies 
Shortly before his ouster, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director 
Nikolai Kovalev disclosed that, over the past two years, the FSB uncovered 
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several attempts by Iranian elements to obtain missile and nuclear technology 
and substances from Russian sources. In a statement issued by the Russian 
Embassy in Tel Aviv, the FSB chief acknowledged that an Iranian embassy 
official and a member of the Iranian military delegation in Russia attempted to 
acquire materials that could be used to produce unconventional weapons. The 
statement was issued at the conclusion of Kovalev's official visit to Israel on 19 
July. Kovalev cited other FSB successes in thwarting the spread of technology 
that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. 
 
A statement summing up his visit issued through the Russian embassy in Tel 
Aviv notes that, per President Boris Yel'tsin's instructions, the FSB will make 
every possible effort to thwart resolutely any attempt to export substances and 
technologies for the production of weapons of mass destruction and launchers. 
Kovalev disclosed that an Iranian Embassy employee who tried to purchase 
documents dealing with missile engines from a Russian citizen was arrested in 
Moscow in November 1997 and that a member of the Iranian military delegation 
who tried to obtain documents dealing with aviation technology from a Russian 
citizen was deported from Moscow in June 1997. (Ma'ariv, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-TAC-
98-201) 
 
In search of new friends 
Noting Latin America's fast development and active integration into the world 
community, Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov stated that the region is 
becoming very important to the world's developing mechanisms of multipolarity. 
While speaking at a foreign ministry meeting on Russia's policy in Latin America, 
Primakov set out a range of top priority practical tasks for future work in that 
region. A press release from the government's main information news agency 
stressed that the new approach was based on a detailed analysis of the current 
state of Russian-Latin American relations. Primakov stressed the role of political 
dialogue, above all at summit level, referring to the recent Russian-Argentinian 
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summit in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1634 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-203) 
 
In pursuit of its multipolar world, the Russian foreign ministry has stepped up its 
efforts to forge strong ties with countries in Africa and Latin America. The ministry 
has actively pursued new contacts in these regions as well as strengthened ties 
with former Soviet allies such as Angola and Cuba.  
 
Seleznev sees OSCE, not NATO, as key to European security 
Nearly parroting the words of Foreign Minister Primakov, State Duma Chairman 
Gennadi Seleznev spoke out against any further NATO expansion east. 
Seleznev stated that further NATO expansion could result in "the artificial 
alienation of Russia from the fundamentals of the European security," negatively 
affecting the vital interests of all states on the continent. Addressing the plenary 
session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Seleznev spoke out against any inclusion of the 
Baltic countries in a new round of NATO expansion. He called the creation of a 
system of security in Europe on the basis of the OSCE one of the most important 
directions of Russian foreign policy. (ITAR-TASS, 1052 GMT, 10 Jul 98; FBIS-
UMA-98-191) 
 
Primakov has long advocated the strengthening of the OSCE in favor of any 
further NATO expansion. The Seleznev statement concerning Baltic inclusion in 
NATO is the often-repeated Primakov line. Primakov has also repeatedly 
proposed that NATO fall under OSCE, which would reduce NATO to a security 
structure answerable to a higher international organization. 
 
Some progress made during Kirienko's visit to Japan 
Russia and Japan continue to move toward signing a peace treaty by 2000 along 
the guidelines established in a November 1997 meeting between Russian 
President Yel'tsin and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto. Although Hashimoto 
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resigned during a 14 July visit by newly appointed Russian Prime Minister Sergei 
Kirienko, a joint communique indicated that progress was indeed made on a 
number of issues. Kirienko's visit to Japan was the first made by a Russian prime 
minister. 
 
As expected, the two countries agreed to cooperate further on establishing 
economic ties. Japan will continue to support Russia's progress toward 
integration with the world economic community, which includes further financial 
support in the economic crisis, support for accelerated membership in the World 
Trade Organization, and future trade relationships. Some of the more serious 
issues of contention, such as the Kurile island dispute, received little attention 
during Kirienko's brief two-day visit. Future meetings will continue as scheduled 
despite the interruption in Japanese leadership. Some of the more important 
future issues which will be ironed out in upcoming months will be the 
establishment of a joint Russian-Japanese investment organization and 
agreements on cooperation in space exploration. 
 
Expulsion of diplomats-part II 
The recent row in Russian-South Korean relations over accusations of espionage 
demonstrates a lack of mutual maturity and understanding which divides the two. 
On 6 July, Russia indiscreetly expelled a South Korean diplomat on charges of 
spying. What remains unanswered is why Russia felt the need to act in such an 
abrupt manner without consultation beforehand. In any case, South Korea 
retaliated by expelling a Russian diplomat. Almost comically, both sides 
announced that the conflict was over even though no serious discussion had 
taken place. (Interfax, 1756 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) When the row 
first began, it seemed likely that it would simply remain a matter between 
intelligence agencies. However, lack of communication between the two sides 
pushed the matter to the highest levels and threatened all diplomatic relations. 
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South Korean officials were taken aback at the ASEAN regional forum in Manila 
when Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov refused to shake hands with 
his counterpart Park Chung-Soo and only provided English language translators 
for the meeting. The two did get together for a protracted meeting but failed to 
put an end to the dispute. The dispute has resulted in a significant loss in South 
Korea's ability to conduct spying activities on North Korea as Russia insisted on 
the removal of five intelligence officers from the Moscow embassy. South Korea 
had kept eight intelligence officers in Moscow since 1990. 
 
Primakov, Kirienko visit China, prepare for September summit 
Primakov made an official visit to China on 22 July. His primary objective was to 
prepare for the informal "no-jackets" meeting between Russian President Boris 
Yel'tsin and Jiang Zemin in Moscow scheduled for September. Primakov met 
with Jiang Zemin, Premier of the State Council Zhu Rongji and Foreign Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan. A joint statement was issued on the India-Pakistan nuclear 
weapons escalation reflecting the desire on both sides to build consensus on 
security issues in Asia. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0143 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-205) Earlier in the month, Prime Minister Kirienko paid a brief visit to 
China and met with Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji for similar purposes. (ITAR-
TASS, 1355 GMT, 16 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-197) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma focuses on procedure for transfer of presidential power 
With a 316 to 1 vote, the Duma passed a bill outlining the mechanism with which 
presidential power would be transferred due to resignation, inability to fulfill his 
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duties due to health, impeachment, or death. The bill allows either house of the 
Federal Assembly to request the Supreme Court to determine presidential 
competence. Under the bill, the court would appoint a medical commission 
nominated by the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. Foreign specialists 
may act as consultants of the commission. The commission would have 14 days 
to report on its findings. 
 
Once the findings are known, the Supreme Court would legally establish the 
president's inability to perform his duties and make this ruling public the next day. 
Upon the ruling, the Federation Council would decide whether the president 
should be removed and the prime minister made acting president. (Interfax, 0912 
GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184) 
 
However, several days after the Duma passage of the bill, the Federation Council 
rejected it by claiming that it violated Russia's Fundamental Law and Civil Code. 
The bill would have spelled out the presently vague procedure of impeachment 
and conviction, as well as the process of finding the president unfit to carry out 
his duties due to reasons of health. Presumably a new draft will be forthcoming 
shortly. (ITAR-TASS, 1526 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) 
 
Duma passes bill on small business tax 
Under the proposed law, small enterprises such as small retail outlets, 
restaurants, and gasoline stations must pay their federal income taxes in 
advance. The reason for the focus on small businesses is that they are known 
tax dodgers; their small size allows them to "escape into the shadows" and hide 
from federal tax agencies. 
 
The interesting part of the bill concerns the mechanism for collecting the taxes. 
The bill envisages moving the responsibility for collecting the small business tax 
from the federal level to the regions, where each region will be required to pass 
the appropriate legislation. The reason for the shift, according to the bill's 
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proponents, is that the regions are closer and thus better positioned to know the 
affairs of small businesses. Under the law, 50 percent of the income tax collected 
will go to the federal budget and 50 percent will go to the regions. 
 
By using the regions as federal tax collectors, the central government is admitting 
that it cannot collect the taxes owed to it. It is clear that even if the Federation 
Council agrees to the law, the relationship between the regions and the federal 
center created by the law will be a difficult one. (ITAR-TASS, 1200 GMT, 15 Jul 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-196) 
 
Duma commission discusses Yel'tsin impeachment 
According to those who initiated the procedure, the first impeachable crime 
committed by the president was his participation in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha 
Agreement which dissolved the Soviet Union. Anatoli Lukyanov, a commission 
member and one of the leaders of the failed August 1991 coup, said the 
commission is ready to provide documents, one of which is the referendum 
supporting retention of the union, as proof of Yel'tsin's villainies. 
 
Any attempt to remove a democratically elected head of state should be taken 
seriously, however, the Duma's present attempt should be understood as a face-
saving move in light of its recent loss to Yel'tsin during the Kirienko appointment 
process. It does not seem likely that the process of impeachment will amount to 
much, especially when one of the principle presidential transgressions cited is an 
act that occurred outside of the present constitution under which the 
impeachment procedure is being conducted. (Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 0900 
GMT, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-201) 
 
REGIONS 
Sobyanin describes provincial power brokers 
In an interesting interview, Federation Council member Sergei Sobyanin 
explained who in fact holds power in the regions. Contrary to most accounts, the 
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president and the supposed economic "oligarchs" are not as powerful as are 
other institutions. For instance, 79 out of 89 regions receive subsidies from 
Moscow, and therefore the finance ministry is quite influential. 
 
Other sources of regional influence are the "force structures" (the prosecutor's 
office, the interior ministry, the Federal Security Service, etc.) which, according to 
Sobyanin, are engaged in collecting bags of compromising materials on regional 
leaders. Most of the information remains within the "force structures" for their 
own use, however, some manages to end up on the Russian president's desk. 
 
Sobyanin also warns against "super-regions" or inter-regional associations such 
as the Siberian Agreement, the Greater Volga, the Greater Urals, etc. The 
possibility exists that they may wish to secede given that their large size makes 
them economically, and perhaps militarily, viable.  
 
Clearly the Russian bureaucracy is no Weberian ideal of modern, rationalized 
state administration, and this bodes ill for attempts to strengthen the Russian rule 
of law through legislation alone. Attention must also be paid to how the laws are 
enforced and interpreted. Instead of relying on the regions for tax collection, as 
the previous Digest entry discussed, perhaps the Federal Assembly and the 
executive branch of government should address the administration of laws, 
edicts, or regulations. (Argumenty i fakty, No. 30, Jul 98 (Signed to press 21 July 
98), p. 4; FBIS-SOV-98-203) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Ray Gaul 
 
Abkhaz peacekeeping mandate renewal 
On 31 July, the CIS mandate on maintaining peacekeepers in Abkhazia expires. 
As the deadline approaches, all sides have expressed their opinions on whether 
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to extend the mandate further. One of the more contentious issues concerns 
Russia's peacekeeping force, which Georgia claims favors the Abkhazian side. 
Evidently, a renewal remains contingent on successful negotiation to satisfy 
Georgia's desire to make the peacekeeping force more impartial. Several 
interesting proposals have emerged with this goal in mind. Suggestions that 
peacekeepers from NATO or from Black Sea countries take over the job of the 
current troops seem unrealistic. A more plausible solution to the standoff would 
be to increase non-Russian CIS peacekeeping troops. 
 
In any case, the failure to reach an agreement on the issue at the Georgian-
Abkhaz talks in Geneva represents a deterioration in relations. (See previous 
Digest.) Clashes in the Gali district in May contributed to the deterioration but 
newly appointed CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovsky managed to get both 
sides to agree on two draft agreements for a peace settlement. Now, any 
progress on these draft agreements will remain conditional on successful 
renewal of a peacekeeping operation of some form. 
 
CIS cooperation supported in theory 
CIS leaders continue to emphasize the need for member countries to cooperate 
on a greater scale. However, the type and means of cooperation which these 
leaders envisage remains vague. Ivan Rybkin, the Russian president's special 
envoy to the CIS countries, quoted President Yel'tsin as saying, "Russia should 
be more active in its cooperation with the CIS countries in the context of both 
bilateral and multi-lateral relations." Comments such as these signal a growing 
belief in the ability of the CIS to perform an important role in relations between 
former Soviet republics but do little to indicate in what direction the CIS will 
evolve. (ITAR-TASS, 1913 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) 
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that change will come. CIS states continue their 
attempts to establish a better-defined role for the interstate body. Vasil 
Shaladonaw, head of a working group on reforming CIS structure and deputy 
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minister of CIS affairs in the Belarusian government, said at a news briefing, "We 
are talking about distributing powers, adding extra powers, improving the very 
structure of the CIS bodies." The working group session concluded at the CIS 
Executive Secretariat in Minsk on 9 July. The next session, scheduled for the end 
of July, promised further changes. (Belapan, 1630 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
191) 
 
Organized Crime 
The war on organized crime continues to receive support at the multilateral level. 
An interstate forum was held in Moscow 6-9 July. The forum drew participants 
from CIS member states, the Baltic states, and police representatives from 
Western countries. The conference participants agreed to concentrate on the 
fulfillment of an interstate program of joint measures against organized crime, 
draft an interstate doctrine of anti-mafia measures, and form a unified data bank 
of organized crime departments of the CIS and the Baltics to watch transnational 
and international relations of criminal groups. The sides will inform each other of 
travels of criminal leaders. (ITAR-TASS, 1337 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
202) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Monica Florescu 
 
UKRAINE 
Debate over role Ukraine should take vis-a-vis NATO 
On 7 July, a program for cooperation between Ukraine and NATO was drafted by 
Ukraine's State Commission for Cooperation with NATO, chaired by the National 
Security and Defense Council secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin. The proposed plan 
stated the necessity of Ukraine's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic 
organizations. (Interfax, 0834 GMT, 8 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189) However, the 
new deputy foreign minister, Oleksandr Chalyy (who was until recently 
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ambassador to Romania), disagrees: He declared that the first realistic step is 
"integration with near abroad countries such as Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Hungary." (UT-1 Television Network, 1500 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189) 
 
On 9 July, Horbulin's proposal won out: Following a meeting with Horbulin, NATO 
Secretary-General Javier Solana and President Leonid Kuchma, the government 
decided to direct energy towards cooperation with NATO countries, especially in 
the military and technological/scientific areas. This new line of policy, the 
government hopes, will boost the economy from the expected increase in orders 
for Ukrainian defense enterprises. (Interfax, 1629 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-UMA-98-
190) 
 
Chernobyl: Deadline for closure might be pushed back 
Due to lack of assets in the Chernobyl international fund, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) suggested on 15 July that donations 
be sought from post-socialist states such as Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia so that the 2000 deadline for closing down the Chernobyl 
nuclear plant can be met. (Interfax, 1535 GMT, 15 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-196) In 
addition, the government declared that automatic payment from wages to the 
Chernobyl fund will be reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent. The Chernobyl Fund 
tax of 5 percent already constitutes a reduction from the earlier 10 percent, 
changed on 1 July by a presidential decree. These drastic reductions are 
intended to help the financial sector of Ukraine's ailing economy. Meanwhile, the 
government plans to allocate 400 million Hyrvnas to the fund from budget 
revenue. (Infobank, 1549 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
Gore's visit helps rebuild confidence 
During US Vice President Albert Gore's visit from 22 July, prospects of 
cooperation were further expanded between Ukraine and the United States. The 
United States promised to invest more money and personnel training to help turn 
Chernobyl's ruined fourth unit into an ecologically safe system (SIP). (Interfax, 
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1110 GMT, 22 Jul 98; FBIS-TEN-98-203) In addition, discussions were held 
regarding additional loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank Organization, which are both expected to assess Ukraine's need for 
financial assistance after the current IMF mission publishes its report this 
summer. Gore agreed with President Kuchma's plan for economic recovery via 
presidential edicts aimed at meeting the requirements put forth by the IMF so that 
Ukraine may become eligible for an Extended Fund Facility loan for a period of 
three years. (Interfax, 1519 GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) The 20 
presidential edicts have been criticized by the opposition parties in parliament, as 
well as by the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (USPP), who 
disliked the independent "powers" that the president had in the economic sector. 
(Kiyevskiye novosti, 11 Jul 98, p. 8; FBIS-SOV-98-205) 
 
BELARUS 
Envoy crisis develops into a conflict between East and West 
The continuing crisis in Belarus over the removal of all foreign envoys from the 
Drozdy compound in Minsk has taken on new proportions. After the European 
Union (EU) banned top Belarusian officials from obtaining visas to visit member 
countries on 10 July (AFP, North European Service, 1752 GMT, 10 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-191), Belarus accused the West of being confrontational rather than 
conciliatory on the matter, and stated that it will not accept any dictates or 
ultimata from the West. The Belarusian first deputy foreign minister, Uladzimir 
Hyarasimovich, went as far as to threaten a possible retaliation against countries 
which refuse visas to Belarusian officials. (ITAR-TASS, 1539 GMT, 14 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-195) Only the neighboring countries of Poland, Lithuania, and 
Latvia, all of which share a border with Belarus, asked the EU to reconsider its 
stance and show a willingness to open a dialogue with President Lukashenka. 
(Radio Riga Network, 1700 GMT, 13 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-194) However, on 14 
July, the European Union published a list of 130 officials who are not to be 
allowed to visit member countries. (Belapan, 1220 GMT, 14 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-195) This action was followed by the US decision, on 15 July, to join the EU's 
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ban on entry visas for top Belarusian officials, except for appearances at the 
United Nations. (Interfax, 1538 GMT, 15 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-196) The US also 
threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Belarus if US marines are not 
allowed to guard the US diplomatic mission's Drozdy residence. (Interfax, 1519 
GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) 
 
In response, the Belarusian foreign minister, Ivan Antanovich, accused the West 
of having plotted the escalation of the crisis so as "to exert unprecedented 
political pressure on Belarus," adding that Belarus' sovereignty was being 
threatened. (BTK Television Network, 1600 GMT, 14 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-196) 
On 17 July, President Lukashenka stated that "the West is trying to achieve its 
goal of having a presidential election held in Belarus in 1999 in violation of the 
present-day constitution," thus suggesting that the West is simply plotting to 
unseat him. (Interfax, 1407 GMT, 17 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-198) The mayor of 
Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, is the only non-Belarusian official who has shown full 
support for Lukashenka. He recognizes Belarus' sovereign right to act as it 
wishes in order to protect the president's residence in Minsk. (Interfax, 1519 
GMT, 23 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-204) 
 
Radio Free Belarus station to broadcast in Poland 
Radio Free Belarus will begin broadcasting in the fall, financed by resources 
provided by the US government and the European Union. However, the 
Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Poland's decision to allow the 
launch of Radio Free Belarus on its territory will not further the development of 
traditionally good neighborly Belarusian-Polish relations, based on the principles 
of mutual respect, independence, sovereignty, and noninterference in the affairs 
of one another. (Radio Minsk Network, 1600 GMT, 14 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-195) 
In addition, Belarus Foreign Minister Ivan Antanovich declared the decision to 
broadcast was a hostile action from Poland, because it will facilitate the 
launching of "campaigns to discredit Belarus." (Interfax, 1413 GMT, 23 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-204) 
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MOLDOVA 
Transdniestr: Differences of opinions maintain conflict 
A final settlement on the conflict between Moldova and the breakaway region of 
Transdniestr is no closer to being reached. On 13 July, Igor Smirnov, leader of 
Transdniestr, asked Russian President Boris Yel'tsin to arrange consultations in 
Moscow in order to settle the Dniestr region conflict with the Moldovan 
government. (Infotag, 1745 GMT, 13 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-194) Then, on 17 
July, the secretary of state of Transdniestr, Valeriu Litkau, claimed that Moldova 
is not concerned with the peace process at the moment, and it currently 
"functions as an independent mechanism without Transdniestr." He therefore did 
not foresee any headway to be made at the meeting between the leaders of 
Moldova and Transdniestr from 21 July. (Interfax, 1503 GMT, 17 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-198). As was expected, the meeting did not bring the two parties closer 
to a settlement of the conflict. The parties differed in their interpretation of the 
memorandum (signed in July of 1997) on normalizing relations between Moldova 
and Transdniestr by facilitating the coexistence of the Slavic minority with the 
Moldovan majority within a single state. In Smirnov's view, the implementation of 
these accords is impeded because Moldova's leaders have focused on resolving 
internal problems -- such as the recent elections and the current economic crisis 
-- and practically do not address the Transdniestr settlement. (ITAR-TASS, 1803 
GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
Promising headway made towards cooperation with the EU  
During its sitting held in Brussels on 15 July, the Coordinating Committee for 
Collaboration between the EU and Moldova adopted the Collaboration Program 
for the years 1998 and 1999. During the meeting, Vice Minister Ion Sturza 
proposed to start negotiations over the possible recognition of Moldova as an 
associated EU member. (Infotag, 1530 GMT, 15 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-196) The 
accord establishes the juridical, political, and administrative framework of the 
Moldovan-European Union cooperation and "will encourage the foreign trade and 
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investments" in the Moldovan economy, said the minister. Efforts are already 
being made to match Moldovan legislation to that of EU countries, as the EU will 
set up an office to test Moldovan laws. (Basapress, 2100 GMT, 16 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-198) The agreement constitutes an important starting point towards 
Moldova's recognition and further incorporation in Europe. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Kazakhstan, China resolve all border disputes at five-nation summit 
The five-nation summit on border security, attended by the foreign ministers of 
Kazakhstan, Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, concluded on 3 July with 
the signing of an agreement to honor the two previous treaties on border security 
(signed in April 1996 and April 1997). The new document also included a few 
other provisions, such as a statement rejecting any type of "national splittism, 
ethnic exclusion and religious extremism," as well as a vow on the part of all five 
countries to battle terrorism, narcotics smuggling, organized crime and any other 
kind of criminal activity which might pose a threat to the countries' "national 
sovereignty, security and social order." (Xinhua, 1346 GMT, 03 Jul 98, FBIS-CHI-
98-184) 
 
Economic issues were also briefly addressed in a clause on the necessity of 
economic cooperation, particularly in the areas of pipeline construction for oil and 
natural gas, water supply, and transportation. However, the foreign ministers 
were unwilling to pledge their support for anything more substantive than 
feasibility studies on ways of supplying electricity to each other. (Xinhua, 1346 
GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-CHI-98-184) 
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On matters of international concern, the five signatories called for all nations 
which had not yet done so, to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and they also called for a peace 
conference to be convened in Bishkek, in order to settle the civil war in 
Afghanistan. (Xinhua, 1346 GMT, 3 Jul 98; FBIS-CHI-98-184) 
 
One of the most concrete results of the summit was a bilateral treaty between the 
Kazakh and Chinese governments that settled the two countries' differences over 
the remaining sections of their border which were still under contention. In 
accordance with this treaty, Kazakhstan will be ceded 1,000 square km, or 53 
percent of the border area by the Baimurza passage (located in eastern 
Kazakhstan) and of the region near the Sary-Charda river (located in Almaty 
oblast'). Following the treaty's signing, President Nazarbaev informed journalists 
that, with this agreement, all of Kazakhstan's border disputes with China have 
been resolved. (Interfax, 0744 GMT, 4 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-185) 
 
Kazakhstan, Russia sign agreements on Caspian, "eternal friendship" 
On 6 July, Presidents Nazarbaev and Yel'tsin finally signed the long-awaited 
agreement on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea's resources, although it was 
the "Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Union Oriented toward the 21st 
Century" which was most loudly hailed by Tair Mansurov, Kazakh ambassador to 
Russia. The main points of the Caspian agreement are the division of the 
resources contained in the seabed by national sector, and the designation of the 
sea's surface as common property to be shared between all of the littoral states. 
(Interfax, 1626 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) This agreement has not been 
accepted by any of the other littoral states and therefore only affects the division 
of Kazakh and Russian resources. Thus far, the littoral states have not come to 
any agreement on how the Caspian's Sea's resources should be divided, nor 
have they yet officially determined the sea's status, although most of them seem 
to be treating it as a sea, and not as a lake. 
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The treaty on eternal friendship, which was also signed on 6 July, consists of a 
series of pledges for mutual cooperation in areas such as trade and investment, 
the formation of a common labor market based on labor migration and job 
creation, the establishment of conditions for free freight and passenger transport 
with a view toward the creation of a joint transport system, and the pursuit of 
common goals in their social policy, including "the phased equalization of 
pensions, allowances, and privileges for various categories of citizens." The 
treaty also contains a statement ensuring equal rights for each country's ethnic 
minorities, and then goes on to state explicitly that Russians living on Kazakh 
territory and Kazakhs living on Russian territory are considered "organic parts of 
the Russian and Kazakh societies." (Rossiyskaya gazeta (Ekonomicheskiy soyuz 
supplement), 18 Jul 98, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-98-208)." 
 
Comment 
The "eternal friendship" treaty's statement on the equality of each country's 
minorities, particularly vis-a-vis Russian and Kazakh minorities, is significant in 
light of the fact that one of the issues on which the Kazakh and Russian 
governments still disagree is the treatment of Russian minorities in Kazakhstan. 
Moscow firmly believes that Russians are widely discriminated against in such 
areas as language policy and state employment. Officials (unnamed) in the 
Russian foreign ministry contend that Russians continue to be forced out of 
Kazakhstan, due to government discrimination against them. According to 
Russian foreign ministry statistics, Kazakhs now hold 83 percent of all 
government posts (as opposed to 50 percent in 1985), while accounting for only 
44 percent of the population (with Russians at 35 percent and Ukrainians at 4.9 
percent). These statistics also state that only 10 percent of radio broadcasts in 
Kazakhstan are in Russian, and television programs in Russian receive less than 
50 percent of total air time. President Nazarbaev directly refuted these charges, 
declaring that Kazakhstan is currently the only CIS state which grants its Russian 
residents the same rights as it does its native population. As an example, he 
cited Russian's co-equal status with Kazakh as a state language and the fact that 
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80 percent of all mass media use the Russian language. (ITAR-TASS, 1610 
GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-187) 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Akaev's right to run for third term approved; parties oppose decision 
In mid-July, following three days of deliberation, Kyrgyzstan's Constitutional 
Court announced its ruling on an appeal by a group of parliament representatives 
on whether President Akaev should be permitted to stand for a third term in 
office. Although the Kyrgyz constitution states that no one may be elected to the 
presidency for more than two terms, and President Akaev has been elected twice 
(in 1991 and in 1995), the first election in which he participated was held under 
the terms of the Soviet constitution, and therefore he is currently serving only his 
first term as president under the new constitution. (ITAR-TASS, 0631 GMT; 13 
Jul 98, FBIS-SOV-98-194) This is the same reasoning which was used by Prime 
Minister Kubanychek Jumaliev in May, when he declared that President Akaev 
was free to run for a third term (see May/June Editorial Digest). 
 
The leaders of ten opposition parties, including the Communist, People's 
Patriotic, Socialist, and Democratic parties, released a statement on 21 July in 
which they expressed their disapproval of the Constitutional Court's ruling, 
declaring that it had made an unlawful decision on an issue which was outside its 
jurisdiction. The opposition parties' statement also implied that the court's action 
was yet one more attempt to weaken the power of the legislature. (Interfax, 0648 
GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Sodirov supporters survive another clash with government troops 
On 1 July, Tajik interior ministry troops launched an operation to destroy Rezvon 
Sodirov's remaining supporters, who have reportedly been harassing and 
intimidating residents in Dushanbe's eastern suburbs for a number of months. 
According to the Tajik government, Sodirov's former cohorts are responsible for 
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kidnappings in the area and the murder of law enforcement officers; 
unfortunately, no specific incidents were cited. The renegade group is now led by 
Saidmukhtor Yorov (Rezvon Sodirov was allegedly killed in a standoff with 
government troops last year, in or near the Romit Gorge) and, according to one 
interior ministry official, consists of 20-40 members. Interior ministry units 
succeeded in capturing 10-20 of Sodirov's men, but were forced to end the 
operation after 11 of their own troops were wounded. (ITAR-TASS, 2254 GMT, 1 
Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183, and ITAR-TASS World Service, 0557 GMT, 3 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-184) 
 
Comment 
The fact that Rezvon Sodirov's gang has been engaging in various sorts of 
criminal activity so close to Dushanbe and for so long does not speak well for the 
Tajik government's ability to enforce its own laws and ensure the safety of its 
citizens. Sodirov's men most likely could not have survived so long without the 
protection and perhaps even collusion of local law enforcement officials. The 
peace agreement between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and President 
Rahmonov's administration does not seem to have resulted in an improved 
atmosphere for cracking down on crime and corruption in Tajikistan. If anything, 
the situation with regard to organized crime (e.g., the narcotics and arms trade) 
seems to have become worse. The number of armed gangs appears to be on the 
rise, and it would not be surprising if the majority of local law enforcement 
officials was aiding and abetting these gangs. 
 
President says murder of UNMOT personnel politically motivated 
On 20 July, four UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) personnel were 
found shot to death in their car, which had been pushed over a cliff near the 
Labijar checkpoint (which is under the control of government troops) in the Garm 
district, approximately 200 km east of Dushanbe. (Interfax, 0855 GMT, 22 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-203) Two of the UNMOT staff were military observers on their way 
to Tavildora district, to check on the local implementation of the peace 
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agreement's military protocol; the other two persons in the car were an interpreter 
(a Tajik citizen) and the driver. Initially, the UNMOT personnel's deaths were 
reported by Tajik Vice-Premier Abdurahmon Azimov to be the result of a car 
accident . (ITAR-TASS, 1325 GMT, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-202) 
 
The UN reacted by recalling to Dushanbe all of its personnel who had been 
working outside the capital and will not allow them to return to their assigned 
areas until the murderers have been identified and taken into custody. (Interfax, 
0851 GMT, 22 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203) The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) delegation chief, Juan Bautista Baqueta, also decided to recall 
all ICRC staff stationed in Garm District. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1137 GMT, 
22 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203) 
 
President Rahmonov immediately appointed a government commission 
consisting of UNMOT officials, National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) 
representatives, and government officials to investigate the murders, and also 
promised to increase security for international aid workers. (Interfax, 1450 GMT, 
22 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203) Speaking to Tajikistan's Security Council on 22 
July, President Rahmonov seemed to be laying the primary blame for the 
UNMOT staff members' deaths on the UTO (ITAR-TASS, 1342 GMT, 22 Jul 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-203); however, at the same time he had First Deputy Defense 
Ministers Abdullo Habibov and Sodik Bobodzhanov removed from their posts and 
issued reprimands to Deputy Vice Premier Abdurahmon Azimov and Defense 
Minister Sherali Khairulloev for their inability to ensure the UNMOT personnel's 
safety. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1051 GMT, 22 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203). 
 
At a meeting on 22 July with Jan Kubis, the UN secretary-general's special envoy 
to Tajikistan, President Rahmonov interpreted the UNMOT members' murder as 
a move meant not only to undermine the inter-Tajik peace process, but also to 
damage his own credibility in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential 
elections. He also voiced the opinion that it was due to the UTO troops' 
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reluctance to disarm and take the oath of allegiance (in compliance with the 
peace agreement's military protocol) that the situation in the Garm district 
remained so unstable as to allow this type of incident to occur. (ITAR-TASS, 
1059 GMT, 22 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-203) 
 
NRC Chairman and UTO leader Said Abdullo Nuri also blamed the UNMOT 
members' murders on the slow implementation of the peace agreement's terms, 
in his discussion of the incident with Kubis on 24 July. Nuri told Mr. Kubis that he 
believes that the murder was an attempt to damage the inter-Tajik peace 
process, but even more specifically, to sully the reputation and authority of Mirzo 
Ziyoev, the UTO commander in charge of much of the Garm district, including 
that portion of the road where the UNMOT personnel were shot. Ziyoev has been 
recommended for the post of defense minister by the NRC. (Voice of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 25 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-208)  
 
Nuri assured Mr. Kubis that, henceforth, all international aid workers would be 
accompanied by UTO commanders, in order to prevent another incident of this 
sort from occurring. He also said that the UTO may have some idea of who was 
behind the fatal attack on the UNMOT personnel, but would wait until the murder 
investigation had been concluded before releasing the perpetrators' identities. 
(Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 25 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-208) 
 
Comment 
Mirzo Ziyoev's appointment to the post of defense minister is indeed now in 
doubt. President Rahmonov rejected his candidacy for this position on 30 July 
and, although he will meet with UTO leader Nuri again to reconsider Mirzo 
Ziyoev's appointment (RFE/RL Newsline, 31 Jul 98), there are no assurances 
that the president will change his mind. 
 
Over 600 UTO troops refuse oath of allegiance in Karategin 
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On 26 July, more than 600 UTO troops, who have been permanently stationed at 
a base in Karategin (located east of Dushanbe), announced that they refused to 
take the oath of allegiance, which is the last step in the process of their 
reintegration into the Tajik armed forces. They cited the Tajik government's 
failure to fulfill the terms of the peace agreement's military protocol, as well as 
President Rahmonov's accusation that the UTO is at least partially responsible 
for the murder of the four UNMOT members as the reasons for their refusal to 
take the oath. (Interfax, 1534 GMT, 24 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-205) 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Israeli investment in Turkmenistan tops $1 billion 
Natan Sharansky, Israel's minister for trade and industry, met with President 
Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat on 2 July in order to discuss the possibility of 
providing Israeli technological aid for Turkmen irrigation projects. Sharansky also 
offered Israel's help in transporting Turkmenistan's natural gas supplies to the 
world market. (Interfax, 1842 GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-183) 
 
A private Israeli investment firm, Merkhav, is already very much involved in 
developing Turkmen oil and natural gas resources. The firm's director, Yosef 
Maiman, joined Minister Sharansky and President Niyazov in their discussion. 
His company has managed to attract ten other foreign firms' investment in the 
projects controlled by Merkhav (e.g., the renovation of Turkmenistan's largest oil 
refinery in Turkmenbashi and the construction of a polypropylene factory in the 
same area). The total cost of the projects that Merkhav is currently involved in 
surpasses $1 billion. Mr. Maiman hopes to diversify his company's interests into 
Turkmenistan's cotton cultivation, as well as to join in the financing of the trans-
Caspian oil pipeline project. (Interfax, 1842 GMT, 2 Jul 98, FBIS-SOV-98-183) 
 
Iran's Ayatollah Khamene'i urges Turkmenistan to reject Israeli aid 
President Niyazov traveled to Tehran on 6 July for a three-day visit with some of 
Iran's top officials. After meeting with President Khatami to discuss the Caspian 
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Sea's legal regime and ways of increasing his country's economic and industrial 
cooperation with Iran (IRNA, 1539 GMT, 6 Jul 98; FBIS-NES-98-187), President 
Niyazov attended a meeting with Ayatollah Khamene'i. The focus of this 
discussion was also the division of the Caspian Sea's resources. In regard to the 
development of the Caspian oil and gas resources, the ayatollah urged President 
Niyazov to refuse the Israeli government's offers of aid for the Caspian 
development projects. The ayatollah expressed the view that Israel's involvement 
in the Caspian Sea area would be detrimental for regional security, particularly 
for Iranian security. (IRIB Television First Program Network, 1630 GMT, 7 Jul 98; 
FBIS-NES-98-188) 
 
Comment 
The Ayatollah Khamene'i's comments to President Niyazov are doubtlessly 
linked to Minister Sharansky's recent visit to Turkmenistan, and the possibility 
that Israel might be granted a piece of the "Caspian pipeline pie." Perhaps Iran is 
beginning to fear that its leverage over issues involving the development of 
Caspian oil and natural gas is beginning to wane. The Russian government 
seems to have dropped out of its previous alliance with Iran over the issue of 
how the Caspian resources should be divided, and the move among most of the 
other littoral states seems to be toward the national sector division plan. Iran 
does exercise some clout over the Turkmen government because of its current 
investments in Turkmenistan, but by now the various Western companies 
involved in the Turkmen oil and gas industry exercise just as much influence over 
President Niyazov's administration, if not more. At this point it is doubtful that Iran 
will be able to exercise much control over Turkmenistan's foreign policy. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Foreign minister's comments trigger criticism 
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Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian's comments to journalists which 
revealed that Armenia intends to annex Nagorno-Karabakh formally at a later 
date sparked criticism from international and domestic critics. "Oskanyan says 
things which a diplomat who respects himself would not say" one newspaper 
commented. The account went on to list all the negative results of that statement: 
French President Chirac postponed his planned visit, the US Congress adopted 
the Silk Road bill that Armenians have been lobbying against, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe condemned the statement, while some OSCE delegates 
talked of reviving the Lisbon declaration which explicitly upheld Azerbaijan's 
territorial integrity. (Golos Armeni, 11 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-194) 
 
Although it is probably far-fetched to attribute all of those adverse results to a 
single statement, Armenians are certainly hearing more forthright criticism of their 
government's policies than they have in the recent past. The French ambassador 
to Armenia, Michel Legras, told journalists: 
 
"The position of France on this issue [Azerbaijan's and Turkey's blockade of 
Armenia] is not very different from the position of the international community. 
You are trying to consign to oblivion the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh, supported 
by Armenia, has occupied a sufficient percentage of Azerbaijani territory; you do 
not want to take into account the seriousness of the refugee problem in 
Azerbaijan, and you are making statements as well, confirming that you do not 
rule out the possibility of annexing Nagorno-Karabakh. If you think that these 
problems are less important than the blockade, you are wrong. To the 
international community, the blockade is the result, not the cause, of the conflict. 
Settle the conflict and the blockade will end. If you cannot understand the 
difference between the main and the secondary, you will not get very far. These 
are the priorities: liberation of the occupied territories; return of the refugees; 
determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh; establishment of peace and 
stability; creation of regional cooperation." 
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If only the OSCE Minsk group spoke with that kind of candor, clarity, and 
precision! Later in the interview, Ambassador Legras suggested that the 
Kocharian government will have to change its positions, "Otherwise Armenia may 
end up in international isolation." 
(Snark, 0630 GMT, 2 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-184) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Official airs complaints against oil companies 
Ilham Aliev, son of President Geyder Aliev and vice president of SOCAR, 
Azerbaijan's state-owned oil company, told the Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo 
that he is "extremely unhappy" with the international oil company consortium, 
AIOC. The financing of the pipeline to Supsa on Georgia's Black Sea coast has 
turned into a very contentious issue which may end up in a court of arbitration. 
Aliev charges that the AIOC has squandered over $200 million on unnecessary 
studies, an expense which threatens to make the western route less profitable 
than the existing northern variant. If the sides don't settle the method of financing 
for the unforeseen $275 million before the construction is completed, SOCAR will 
bring the matter to court. 
 
Aliev also expressed frustration with the slow pace and confused nature of the 
talks on the main export pipeline which are scheduled to decide the route of the 
pipeline before October: "It is hard to believe that the negotiations on 
determination of the route of transportation of the main oil will be completed by 
October. I personally am not clear on what goals they are pursuing." As Aliev 
explained, the AIOC responded to the slump in oil prices by abandoning the plan 
to build the main pipeline. Turkey was also alarmed by the AIOC's delay tactics 
and interpreted them as the result of concerns about cost. For that reason, 
Turkey made the western route more financially attractive. To this end, it was 
able to alter the proposed route, cutting $800 million from the original cost. The 
AIOC representatives, in Aliev's estimation, do not take Turkey's protestations 
against increased tanker traffic in the straits very seriously and count on US 
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pressure to make that option available. The AIOC's reluctance to construct the 
main pipeline to Ceyhan makes the proposed routes through Ukraine or Romania 
even more attractive. (Zerkalo, 20 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189, and Turan, 1140 
GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) 
 
Nuclear smuggling discovered ... again 
The staff of the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security have averted an attempt 
to sell radioactive substances for a second time this year. Four persons were 
arrested in Baku in July for trying to sell a container with cesium-isotope for $1.4 
million. This substance was probably obtained from the former Soviet and 
Russian military bases in Azerbaijan. The ministry is also looking for another 14 
types of radioactive materials stolen from various chemical enterprises. 
According to Azerbaijani authorities, the intended buyer was certainly a state: "It 
is naive to think that some private trader would buy a container with cesium just 
so he could spend his leisure time testing it with a dosimer and enjoying the 
crackling sound produced by the device." Most likely the intended buyer was 
Iran--something Iran naturally denies--as was the case in March when 22 tons of 
special alloyed steel were seized on the Iranian border. (Zerkalo, 4 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-188) 
 
GEORGIA 
Others build where Russians plunder 
On 27 June Georgian and Russian officials agreed on a timeline and procedure 
for the transfer of border protection to the Georgian authorities. On 16 July the 
process of handing over the sea border began; this should be completed before 
the end of the year. The rest of the border will be transferred by 10 July 1999. In 
this connection, President Shevardnadze praised the "correct position" of the 
new commander of Russian border guards, General Bordyuzha. (Radio Tbilisi 
Network, 0611 GMT, 13 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-194) 
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Valeriy Chkheidze, the chief of the Georgian border guards, described the status 
of border demarcation to a Russian newspaper. Demarcation has been 
performed on much of the border with Russia, although some sections still 
require clarification. The same is true for the border with Azerbaijan. Due to some 
technical reasons, this work has not begun on the Armenian border. There are 
"no problems" with the border with Turkey 
 
Chkheidze described his preferred process of taking over border protection from 
the Russian guards. Georgian border guards would be sent to the border posts to 
work with and train under the Russians. "We are not breaking off relations, we 
are simply relieving the Russian border guards of an extra burden." Since most of 
the border area with Russia is in the mountains, historically the local population 
has been responsible for guarding those portions. The Georgian authorities are 
trying to revive that practice and three headquarters are already fully staffed in 
this manner. In the sea sections, the Georgians intend to adopt the American 
coast guard system.  
 
Commenting on Russia's removal of border and naval equipment, Chkheidze 
said, "There is practically nothing now. Everything has been destroyed and 
plundered... This is strategic partnership in action." If the Georgian plan of 
sending their own border guards to man the posts during the transitional period is 
adopted, there might be some chance of preventing spiteful vandalism in the 
future. "This has been encountered repeatedly. Concrete has been poured down 
the sewers, for example. In order to part friends, both sides should behave with 
dignity." (Obshchaya gazeta, 25 Jun-1 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189) 
 
Ukraine was the first to help Georgia by providing coast guard ships from its 
share of the Black Sea Fleet about a year ago; its naval officers are currently 
training Georgian coast guards. Other states have joined in that process. The 
United States allocated $18 million for the creation of the border infrastructure, 
delivered a patrol craft, and paid for the training of Georgian coast guard and 
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border troops. Germany has also provided a coast guard ship, while Turkey has 
promised to supply spare parts. (Monitor, 4 Aug 98) Currently the Georgian coast 
guard has one Tartura-class escort ship, seven patrol cutters, and six armored 
boats. (ITAR-TASS, 1823 GMT, 18 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-109) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
LATVIA 
Moscow does not believe in ... embargoes? 
Apparently the Russian parliament wasn't listening when Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said at the beginning of July that his country did 
not believe in embargoes (see previous Digest): Both the Duma and Federation 
Council, in support of a statement initiated by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, have 
called for Russia to use any available measures to retaliate against perceived 
violations of rights of ethnic Russians in Latvia. (Baltic News Service Daily 
Report, 1600 GMT, 9 Jul 98) According to the Federation Council, "the Russian 
Federation Government could look at the question of imposing an economic 
embargo on the Republic of Latvia." (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-204) The Duma has been calling for economic sanctions against Latvia for 
years, in response to any number of slights ranging from alleged mistreatment of 
ethnic Russians (Interfax, 0959 GMT, 6 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-065) to the 
"hostile rhetoric" of Saeima members who passed the declaration on Latvia's 
occupation. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 Oct 96; FBIS-SOV-96-200) 
 
Apparently, communication obstacles work both ways: On 7 July Rakhmanin 
called Latvian complaints about sanctions "completely ungrounded." (ITAR-
TASS, 1222 GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) 
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Luzhkov's statement cited the Latvian law which stipulates that, beginning on 1 
August, aliens leaving Latvia while holding only passports from the (now 
nonexistent) USSR needed to obtain an entrance visa before they would be 
allowed to return. What he neglected to mention was the fact that holders of 
former Soviet passports have been granted several extensions for obtaining 
Latvian non-citizen passports. The usefulness of former USSR passports for 
travel between Latvia and Russia was to have expired on 31 December 1997 
(Baltic News Service, 1700 GMT, 16 Dec 97), and then on 31 March 1998. 
(Baltic News Service, 1400 GMT, 5 Jan 98) By mid-March, however, only 15 
percent of non-citizens had received the Latvian passports. (Baltic News Service, 
1700 GMT, 18 Mar 98) The Saeima subsequently extended former USSR 
domestic passports until 31 July 1998, and former USSR foreign passports until 
31 October 1998, a move that was dismissed as a half measure by 
approximately 2,000 aliens who attended a rally at the end of March to protest. 
(Interfax, 1623 GMT, 31 Mar 98; FBIS-SOV-98-090) The protesters sought an 
extension until the year 2000, and criticized as "cynical and insulting" PM 
Guntars Krasts' statement that indefinite extension of former Soviet passports 
would not encourage aliens to obtain new Latvian documents. 
 
While the Russian government considers its parliament's demands to hit at 
Latvia's economy, it managed to demonstrate how high a priority it holds good-
neighborly relations, not to mention basic decency: The Russian Embassy in 
Riga announced tougher visa requirements were to be instituted for Latvian 
citizens, with no lead time. Moreover, emergency visas will no longer by granted 
to Latvian citizens, according to the head of the Consular Section of the Russian 
Embassy. The shortest time for visa processing is five days. (Radio Tallinn 
Network, 1300 GMT, 17 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-198) 
 
OSCE, EC reassure Latvia, rebuke Russia about recommendations 
Recent complaints by Russia that the Latvian citizenship law amendments 
passed in June did not meet international requirements earned an immediate 
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refutation by OSCE Commissioner for Nationalities Max van der Stoel. (see 
previous Digest) The European Union has also weighed in, urging the Latvian 
government to accelerate the integration of minorities into society and the 
promulgation of the amendments--in the face of stalling action by the nationalist 
For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction. However, European Commission 
representative Hans van der Broek recommended that, rather than criticizing the 
amendments (as only Russia had), the entire international community should 
welcome the steps Latvia had taken to meet OSCE recommendations, since 
such a response would only help the amendments be put into effect. (Interfax, 
1143 GMT, 9 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-190) 
 
Moreover, Van der Broek said he doubted Russia's economic pressure would 
improve the situation of the ethnic Russian residents of Latvia. (Interfax, 1402 
GMT, 10 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-191) The EC, he said later, considers Russia's 
policy to be unproductive. (Radio Riga Network, 1200 GMT, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-201) 
 
In discussions focusing on the amendments and the collection of signatures for a 
referendum, concern has been voiced that Latvia could face additional 
recommendations from the international community. In fact, PM Guntars Krasts 
warned of that very danger in remarks supporting the referendum. However, both 
Van der Stoel (Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 17 Jul 98) and Van der Broek 
have assured the government that no further recommendations were planned. 
(Radio Riga Network, 1200 GMT, 20 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-201) 
 
Demographic danger disappearing 
Meanwhile, the possibility that the titular nationality will be overrun by other 
ethnic groups seems to be on the wane. The Central Statistics Department has 
reported an increase in ethnic Latvians, and a 1.5 percent decrease in ethnic 
Russians (with smaller decreases in the percentages of Belarusians, Ukrainians, 
Jews and Poles) in the last decade. In 1989, 52 percent of Latvian's residents 
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were ethnic Latvians, while in the beginning of 1997 the percentage had grown to 
55.3 percent. (Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 9 Jul 98) The department 
reported that the country's population in 1997 approached 2.5 million persons, 
with 1,371,600 Latvians, 805,700 Russians, 98,800 Belarusians, 72,600 
Ukrainians, 45,600 Poles, 31,800 Lithuanians, 10,300 Jews, 7,600 Gypsies, 
2,700 Estonians, 1,800 Germans, and 22,400 from other nationalities. 
 
Emigration certainly accounts for some of the demographic changes, especially 
from the Baltic states to Russia. According to Tatiana Regent, director of the 
Russian Federal Migration Board, between 1992 and 1997 Russia received 
67,973 emigrants from Estonia, 108,276 from Latvia, and 52,183 from Lithuania. 
The peak period was in 1994, Regent said. Since then the numbers have been 
dropping. In 1997, 3,483 residents moved to Russia from Estonia, while the 
figures for emigrants from Latvia and Lithuania were 5,658 and 1,758, 
respectively, she said. (Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 23 Jul 98) 
 
Polish representatives seek better ethnic educational opportunities 
Russian-speaking residents of Latvia do not constitute the only minority 
clamoring for attention. Representatives of the country's Polish residents met 
with Poland's president, Aleksandr Kwasniewski, when he visited Riga University 
on 8 July. They were not protesting any citizenship issues, however: They sought 
more financial support from the state. Polish schools need financing, modern 
equipment and well-educated teachers, Kwasniewski was told. There are six 
Polish schools, with a total enrollment of 1200 children, in Latvia. (PAP, 1422 
GMT, 8 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-189) Kwasniewski reportedly took the matter up 
with Latvian government officials. (Polskie Radio First Program Network, 1400 
GMT, 7 Jul 98; FBIS-SOV-98-188) 
 
ESTONIA 
Russian town residents see greener grass across border 
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Residents of the Russian town of Ivangorod have appealed to President Yel'tsin 
for the town's annexation to Estonia. According to Aleksandr Tsinev, a 
representative of the Leningrad Oblast governor, the initiative followed several 
expressions of no confidence in the mayor and town council by Ivangorod 
inhabitants. (Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 14 Jul 98). 
 
At issue is the apparent mismanagement by municipal leaders, which has led to 
unemployment, lack of public transportation and television, the collapse of the 
municipal economy, and complete inactivity of the town government, Tsinev said. 
The final straw was a substantial reduction in the town's water supply. After 
months of warning that the town's debt for water and sewerage had remained 
unpaid, and ample time for the town government to make arrangements for 
payment, on 13 July Estonia AS Narva Vesi cut the water flow to 25 percent of 
normal. "I can't rule out we'll break our contract with Ivangorod altogether," said 
Narva Vesi's general director, Aksel Ers. The town's total debt, with fines for late 
payment, is approaching 10 million kroons (US$703,800). Money for the payment 
of the debt must be allocated from the budget of Russia's Leningrad region. 
Ivangorod and the Estonian town of Narva share water supply and sewage 
systems from Soviet times. (Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 13 Jul 98) 
 
LITHUANIA 
KGB employment law stalled over questions of constitutionality 
Stating his belief that the law is "dubious from the point of view of the Constitution 
or international law," President Valdas Adamkus refused to sign into force a 
recently passed bill that would impose employment restrictions on former KGB 
officials. The legislation would bar former employees of the Soviet KGB from all 
state and a number of private structures, including banks and law firms, for 10 
years. Adamkus suggests the parliament delay enacting the law, and instead 
seek a decision on the constitutionality of the bill from the Constitutional Court. 
(Baltic News Service, 1600 GMT, 10 Jul 98) The Center Union and Democratic 
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Labor Party (LDLP) voiced support of Adamkus' stand. (ELTA, 0756 GMT, 10 Jul 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-191) 
 
Parliament voted in favor of Adamkus' proposal to delay enactment of the law 
until 1 January 1999, but dismissed the idea of appealing to the Constitutional 
Court. Instead, the governing Conservatives plan to rework the wording of the bill 
to aim for a consensus and "to eliminate any doubts as to its constitutionality." 
(Baltic News Service 1600 GMT, 17 Jul 98) In the meantime, the LDLP has 
begun to collect signatures for such an appeal (29 MP signatures are required); 
however, only an appeal by parliament as a whole would delay enactment of the 
bill until the court issues its decision. (Baltic News Service, 1300 GMT, 20 Jul 98) 
 
Prosecutor: Third Unit did not carry out illegal surveillance 
The Prosecutor General's Office announced on 14 July that the Third Unit of the 
Interior Ministry's VIP Security Department did not carry out illegal surveillance 
operations against presidential candidates, state leaders or other officials. 
According to a spokesman, the office determined that the Third Unit had 
overstepped the powers of the VIP Security Department, but had not committed 
anything actionable. (Baltic News Service, 1000 GMT, 15 Jul 98) 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 1998 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol3/ed0311.html. 
